From the Field: Privileged Groups

๐Ÿ”Ž ๐—™๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—บ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—™๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐—น๐—ฑ โ€” Real-World Findings from Security Assessments

๐Ÿ’ฅย ๐Ÿณ๐Ÿฒ.๐Ÿฎ%ย of infrastructures Iโ€™ve assessedย ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐—ฒ๐—ฝ ๐—ฝ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ด๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฝ๐˜€ ๐—ฝ๐—ผ๐—ฝ๐˜‚๐—น๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฐ/๐Ÿณ

And yes โ€” weโ€™re back in the 70% range, I skipped them by mistake.

๐—Ÿ๐—ฒ๐˜โ€™๐˜€ ๐˜€๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜ ๐˜„๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฎ๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐˜€:

โŒ You donโ€™t need to be in Enterprise Admins or Schema Admins 24/7.

โŒ You should not use default groups like Server Operators, Account Operators, etc. These sound harmless โ€” but in reality, they often enable escalation paths attackers can exploit.

โœ… Review your privileged groups regularly.

โœ… Remove any accounts that donโ€™t absolutely need to be there.

(โš ๏ธ Donโ€™t touch the default AD\Administrator โ€” thatโ€™s your DR account.)

You can scan for these misconfigurations using ๐—”๐——๐—ฃ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ โ€” my free and transparent AD assessment tool.

๐—”๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ถ๐—ณ ๐˜†๐—ผ๐˜‚ ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ผ๐—ป-๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ฝ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐˜€, ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—ป๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ ๐—ถ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—๐˜‚๐˜€๐˜-๐—œ๐—ป-๐—ง๐—ถ๐—บ๐—ฒ (๐—๐—œ๐—ง) ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ฐ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜€:

๐Ÿ”น Microsoft PAM for on-prem AD

๐Ÿ”น Microsoft Entra PIM (for cloud & hybrid environments)

๐Ÿ”น Or follow Microsoftโ€™s manual PIM model (this is quite old)

(I will provide resources for these in the comments)

Usually 3rd party tools are used, these are just examples from Microsoft – but you can do quite a lot with them.

Start small. Review your groups. Then grow into JIT if needed.

๐Ÿ” ๐——๐—ผ ๐˜†๐—ผ๐˜‚ ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ฒ ๐—๐—œ๐—ง, ๐—ฃ๐—œ๐— , ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐—ฃ๐—”๐—  ๐—ถ๐—ป ๐˜†๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฟ ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ด?