๐ Secure Bits ๐ก
๐๐ผ ๐๐ผ๐ ๐ธ๐ป๐ผ๐ ๐ต๐ผ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ธ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ ๐ต๐ถ๐ฑ๐ฒ ๐ถ๐ป๐๐ถ๐ฑ๐ฒ ๐๐ฐ๐๐ถ๐๐ฒ ๐๐ถ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐?
Itโs called persistence. Attackers often want to stay in your environment long-term without being spotted – which means being a loud Domain Admin is usually not the plan.
To spot this, you need to understand what options attackers have and how ACLs + object relationships can create an escalation path they can quietly keep โreadyโ for later.
A few examples:
1๏ธโฃ ๐๐ฑ๐บ๐ถ๐ป๐ฆ๐๐๐ผ๐น๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฟ
AdminSDHolder is an AD container whose ACL is used as a ๐๐ฒ๐บ๐ฝ๐น๐ฎ๐๐ฒ for privileged accounts and groups.If an attacker modifies permissions here, they can gain powerful access without joining privileged groups – and thatโs exactly why itโs dangerous.
2๏ธโฃ ๐๐๐ฆ๐ต๐ฎ๐ฑ๐ผ๐
DCShadow is based on privileges that allow an account to ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐น๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐๐ฒ changes to AD from a compromised โrogue domain controllerโ. These include:
โข Add/Remove Replica In Domain
โข DS-Replication-Synchronize
โข DS-Replication-Manage-Topology
3๏ธโฃ ๐๐๐ฆ๐๐ป๐ฐ
DCSync is based on privileges that allow an account to ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐น๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐๐ฒ AD database data (including secrets). These include:
โข Replicating Directory Changes
โข Replicating Directory Changes All
The tricky part is that some tools and service accounts may legitimately need replication rights or special ACLs – which makes them high-value targets. Theyโre powerful, but not always obvious.
โธป
๐จ You can check these settings occasionally, sure. But in real environments the bigger problem is ๐ฑ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ณ๐: changes happen over time and nobody notices.
โ Thatโs one reason I started collaborating with Forestall, specifically their ๐๐ฆ๐ฃ๐ ๐ฝ๐น๐ฎ๐๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ๐บ – it helps you detect these persistence methods (ACL changes, replication rights, risky relationships) and ๐ฎ๐น๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ ๐๐ผ๐ ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐น๐.
๐งช ๐ช๐ฎ๐ป๐ ๐๐ผ ๐๐ฟ๐ ๐ถ๐?
Because of this collaboration you can get a free trial:
https://forestall.io/platform
โ Click Request a Demo โ in the message write: โHorizon Secured โ Free Trial Requestโ (so they know you came from me)
